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On October 27, 1994, the Procter & Gamble Company ("P & G")
filed suit against Bankers Trust Company, alleging that the defendant
had engaged in "fraudulent conduct to induce [P & G] to enter into
and to remain in two complex leveraged derivative transactions"
leading to losses of more than one hundred million dollars.' On
January 17, 1995, as part of the usual procedure in a case involving
commercial clients, both parties stipulated to a protective order 2
thereby putting confidential company documents under seal and
protecting the materials produced during discovery.' On September
12, 1995, though the complaint was filed under seal and was legally
"hands off' to parties outside of the litigation, Business Week legal
affairs editor Linda Himelstein obtained a copy of a 300-page
amended complaint filed by P & G in the United States District
Court in the Southern District of Ohio.'
Himelstein, who had been investigating the lawsuit for an article
for Business Week, received a copy of the complaint from a confiden-
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I Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 187 (S.D. Ohio
1995); see also G. Bruce Knecht, P & G Can Add Racketeering to Its Claims: Pressure on
Bankers Trust to Settle Case Is Raised by U.S. Judge's Ruling, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at
A3.
2 Protective orders generally impose confidentiality on materials exchanged during
discovery. See infra note 13.
3 See Procter & Gamble Co., 900 F. Supp. at 187.
1 SeeJohn E. Morris, How Could Anyone Lose This Case , AM. LAW., Nov. 1995, at 5,
62-63 (explaining how Himelstein obtained the document).
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tial source at Sullivan & Cromwell, Bankers Trust's counsel.5 On
September 13, when Business Week sought to publish a cover story
based on the complaint, United States District Court Judge John
Feikens faxed a restraining order just hours before the magazine's
publication deadline.6 Business Week immediately sought expedited
review from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the
United States Supreme Court but was denied by both courts.7 On
October 3, 1995, at the behest of Business Week, Judge Feikens held
a hearing that ultimately led to his upholding the restraining order
and, simultaneously, unsealing the protective order: this two-step
approach maintained the injunction barring publication of the
original confidential documents while allowing Business Week and
others to make photocopies public.8 On March 5, 1996, in a case
that generated widespread media interest and support,9 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed Feikens's order
on the grounds that it constituted an unconstitutional prior
restraint.10
The Business Week situation is only the most recent instance of an
evolving phenomenon: the tension between the American traditions
of open trial proceedings and freedom of the press, and the
application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their revised
discovery provisions." Whereas the First Amendment has been
I See Milo Geyelin, Leaky Credibility: Big Law Firm's Gaffe Over Sealed Records Raises
Troubling Issues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at Al (discussing Himelstein's "source" at
the New York law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell who gave the documents to Business
Week, "believ[ing] they were public").
6 See Linda Himelstein, et al., The Story Behind the Bankers Trust Story, BUS. WK., Oct.
2, 1995, at 58 (describing how Business Week received and reacted to the restraining
order).
7 See Procter & Gamble Co., 900 E Supp. at 188.
8 See id. at 192-93.
' Business Week, with the support of media organizations including The New York
Times, Time Warner, DowJones, ABC News and Newsweek, shipped emergency appeals
to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and then to the United States Supreme
Court, urging that Feiken's order be overturned because of its disregard of precedent
prohibiting prior restraints against the press. See Himelstein, supra note 6, at 59.
Conversely, Bankers Trust argued that because the materials were taken from sealed
court records, Business Week should never have received them; Bankers Trust
maintained that it would suffer "irreparable harm" if the materials were published.
See id. at 58-59.
1" See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F3d 219, 224-27 (6th Cir.
1996).
" SeeArthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 431-32 (1991) (arguing that "promoting increased public
access to information by restricting the discretion of the courts to protect confidential
information is ill-advised").
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
found to support public access to trial proceedings, 2 Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(c) ("Rule 26(c)") grants broad discretion to
the courts in implementing protective orders: 3 Such orders allow
the trial courts substantial leeway in restricting public access to
pretrial discovery materials, which may implicate various other
interests, including privacy interests and commercial interests. 4 In
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,5 the Supreme Court addressed this
tension by emphasizing the private nature of pretrial discovery
materials, effectively defeating First Amendment challenges to Rule
26(c) protective orders.1" While settling the constitutional question
of the validity of restricting public access to discovery materials
through protective orders, Rhinehart left open the question of
whether media nonparties who obtain "protected" discovery materials
12 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986)
[hereinafter Press-Enterprise Co.] (finding that the "FirstAmendment right of access...
applies to preliminary hearings as conducted in California"); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (finding a First Amendment right to attend
criminal trials).
15 Rule 26(c) provides, in relevant part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith
conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to
resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the
court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to
a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken
may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
including one or more of the following:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of
the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development,
or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in
a designated way;
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c).
14 The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 26(c) recognize the court's discretion
with regard to imposing protective orders on discovery material, noting that the court
must "weigh [a litigant's] claim to privacy against the need for disclosure." FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(c) advisory committee's notes (1970 amendments).
15 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
11 See id. at 83-34 (noting that "restraints placed on discovered, but not yet
admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of
information" and therefore "implicate[] the First Amendment rights of the restricted
party to a far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination of information in
a different context").
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through mistake or illegitimate means are likewise bound by such an
order.
17
This Comment proposes that a court may, under certain
circumstances, utilize its injunctive power to prevent confidential
discovery materials under a protective order from being published by
a media nonlitigant.'8 Because this position seems to fly in the face
of First Amendment considerations, Part I of this Comment will
examine the tension between the clear presumption against
suppression of speech and prior restraints highlighted in such
seminal cases as New York Times Co. v. United States19 and Nebraska
Press Ass'n. v. Stuart,2" and the protection afforded to confidential
discovery materials that are under seal in Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart.2" Part II will examine the theoretical arguments support-
ing the extension of protective orders to nonparties. These policy
arguments, which include the litigants' privacy and property interests
and the court's interest in an efficient process, are critical because
they counter the strong First Amendment considerations in this area.
Part III demonstrates how these policy arguments shape legal
doctrine enabling a court to establish a property right in certain
intangible commercial information.2  The intangible property
interest is crucial because by establishing a property interest in
information covered by a protective order, a court may justify a
restraining order on the grounds of protecting private property, even
in the face of a legitimate First Amendment claim. This conflict
caused by the attempt to balance private property rights and First
" See id. at 32 (finding that a litigant has no First Amendment right of access "to
information made available only for the purposes of trying his suit," but not
addressing the question of nonlitigant access).
18 Because the considerations and interests vary tremendously depending on the
type of nonparty who has information subject to a protective order, this Comment is
limited in scope to the media nonparty. Other nonparties, such as successive litigants
or other interested individuals, will not be examined.
19 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1963) for the proposition that "'[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression...
bear[s] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity'").
20 427 U.S. 539, 539 (1976) (asserting that "the barriers to prior restraint remain
high" and concluding that the burden required to impose a prior restraint was not
met in that case).
21 Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 37 (holding that where a "protective order is entered on
a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial
civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained
from other sources," the order is consistent with the First Amendment).
22 Proprietary interests in information may constitute patents, copyrights, or trade
secrets and other confidential business information. See infra Part II.C.
PROTECTVE ORDERS
Amendment considerations has developed into a highly malleable
and confused area of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part IV
proposes a standard for enforcing protective orders against media
nonlitigants, a standard determined by the property interest in the
information sought to be protected.
I. PROTECTIVE ORDERS, NONPARTIES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
CHALLENGE: SETTING THE LEGAL BACKDROP
The language of the First Amendment is clear: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. ' 23 A pervasive tension exists, however, between the applica-
bility of the First Amendment to judicial proceedings and the
authority, of the courts to remove documents from public access.24
Whereas the United States has a longstanding tradition of allowing
the public to view judicial proceedings and daily court activities,
25
this right of access is not absolute. 26 The justice system recognizes
several circumstances-such as attorney-client privilege, settlement
negotiations,28 grand jury proceedings2 9 and discovery--where
confidentiality is not only allowed, but is necessary.3 1 Moreover,
23 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
24 See Katherine W. Pownell, Comment, The First Amendment and Pretrial Discovery
Hearings: When Should the Public and Press Have Access?, 36 UCLA L. REV. 609, 610
(1989) (arguing that the First Amendment presumption of public access to judicial
proceedings and the broad discretion courts have in restricting access to pretrial
discovery materials are in conflict).
2 See Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) ("[O]ne of the important means of
assuring a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral observers."); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570-71 (1980) (stating that public access
to criminal trials is essential to maintain confidence in the justice system); Miller,
supra note 11, at 428 (stating that "[b]y longstanding tradition, the American public
is free to view the daily activities of the courts").
26 See Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 9 ("But even when a right of access attaches,
it is not absolute.").
27 SeeUnited States v. Noriega, 917 F2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1990) ("The general
public has no right of access to private communications between a defendant and his
counsel.").
28 See Allen v. Colgate Palmolive Co., No. 79 Civ. 1076 (CSH), 1986 WL 8218, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1996) (upholding a settlement agreement containing
confidentiality provisions).
I See United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) (noting the
interests served by "'safeguarding the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings'")
(quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979)).
11 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (noting that "pretrial
depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial").
s' See Miller, supra note 11, at 429 (discussing situations where confidentiality is
recognized and enforced by the courts).
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trial judges are given broad discretion to determine whether to allow
any public access to materials for litigation and settlement negotia-
tions.
3 2
The tension between presumed "openness" and court-enforced
confidentiality is even more pronounced when one of the parties
affected is the press.'3 When a protective order is imposed on
discovery materials and publication or dissemination of the material
is prohibited, this order is analogous to a prior restraint 4 on the
litigant's speech. 5 As the Supreme Court has previously recog-
nized, prior restraints are "one of the most extraordinary remedies
known to our jurisprudence"36 and are particularly disfavored. 7
In view of this longstanding judicial hostility to prior restraints and
the highly correlative nature of prior restraints and protective orders,
the situation in which a member of the media has acquired court-
protected discovery materials pertaining to litigation of which it is not
a party requires an examination of the legal doctrine covering
protective orders and prior restraints on the media.
A. Pretrial Discovery Materials Are Not Presumptively Public-
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
Prior to Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,3 many courts and com-
mentators debated whether the First Amendment limited the right
to enforce a protective order against the parties themselves.3 9
32 See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917)
(observing that trial judges have great discretion "to determine whether, to whom,
and under what precautions" certain materials and activities need to be revealed).
13 Note, for example, the unified media response to the case of McGraw-Hill Cos.
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6 (1995) (mem.), as evidenced by the amicus brief
supportive of McGraw-Hill Cos. by Dow Jones & Co., The Cincinnati Enquirer, The Los
Angeles Times, Newsday and the American Society of Newspaper Editors. SeeProctor &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 232 (6th Cir. 1996) (Brown, J.,
concurring); see also supra note 9.
34 A prior restraint is a technical term in First Amendment law that refers to the
"imposition of a restraint on a publication before it is published." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1194 (6th ed. 1990).
" See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that a protective
order prohibiting publication was deficient because an order restricting a litigant's
speech should only be permitted where a prior restraint would bejustified). But see
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (upholding a protective order that
prohibited publication of the membership of a religious organization).
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
17 See id. at 559 (finding that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and least tolerable on First Amendment rights").
38 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
" Compare In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 196 (invalidating a protective order on the
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Protective orders were analogized to "prior restraints" on free speech
of the litigants, and the orders were therefore arguably subject to
strict scrutiny.4" In 1984, the Supreme Court firmly addressed the
issue of a litigant's First Amendment rights with regard to a protec-
tive order in Rhinehart.
In Rhinehart, a religious organization and its spiritual leader
brought a defamation action in a Washington state court against two
newspapers that had written stories about them. 41 In response to
the defendants' discovery request seeking lists of the organization's
members and contributors, the plaintiffs sought a protective order to
limit the use of the lists outside the trial.42 Based in part on the
defendants' stated intent to continue publishing articles about the
plaintiffs using information gained in discovery, the trial court issued
a protective order that "prohibited [the newspapers] from publish-
ing, disseminating, or using the information in any way except where
necessary to prepare for and try the case." 43 Because the newspa-
pers had access to the discovery materials for trial use, but were
forbidden from publishing or disseminating the material, the order
implicated a First Amendment prior restraint.
The Supreme Court emphatically endorsed the constitutionality
of protective orders, stating that pretrial discovery was "not [a] public
component[] of a civil trial"44 and reasoning that such an order
"did not involve a restriction on the use of a traditionally public
source of information." 45  Moreover, the Court noted that it had
ground that it would constitute an unjustified prior restraint) with Richard L. Marcus,
Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (1983) ("The
reality against which constitutional and common law issues should be assessed is,
therefore, a reality of confidentiality-one that is inherent in the discovery process
and essential if parties are to avoid the unwarranted harm that may result from the
intrusiveness of modem discovery.").
I See Michael Dore, Confidentiality Orders-The Proper Role of the Courts in Providing
Confidential Treatment for Information Disclosed Through the Pre-Trial Discovery Process, 14
NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1978) (arguing that "[o]nce access to the purportedly
confidential information has been obtained, judicial restrictions on the use of such
information must meet the very strict requirements justifying any other type of prior
restraint").
41 See Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 22-23.
42 See id. at 25.
43 Id. at 27.
4Id. at 33. The Court went on to explain the "private" nature of discovery in a
footnote, stating that "[d]iscovery rarely takes place in public." Id. at 33 n.19.
Moreover, the Court stated that "to the extent that courthouse records could serve as
a source of public information, access to that source customarily is subject to the
control of the trial court." Id.
4s Pownell, supra note 24, at 622.
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previously decided that a litigant has no First Amendment right of
access to information made available only for purposes of trying a
suit.46 Thus, the Court reasoned that "continued court control over
the discovered information does not raise the same specter of
government censorship that such control might suggest in other
situations."47
In upholding the Washington trial court's ability to impose and
enforce a protective order,4 8 the Court emphasized the interest of the
trial court in maintaining control over the litigation process.4 9 The
Court noted that discovery has a "significant potential for abuse,"
which may encompass not only delay and extra expense but also the
acquisition of sensitive information that "could be damaging to
reputation and privacy" if released.5 0 Liberal discovery is not
provided to litigants to achieve this end but "for the sole purpose of
assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated
disputes.""' The opinion explained that because of the liberal
discovery rules, "it is necessary for the trial court to have the
authority to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c)."52
Given the weight afforded to a trial court's management of the
litigation process, the Court concluded that protective orders do not
offend the First Amendment when "a protective order is entered on
a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the
context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemina-
tion of the information if gained from other sources."" While the
4 See Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 32 ("'The right to speak and publish does not carry
with it the unrestrained right to gather information.'" (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965))).
47 Id.
4 It should be noted that the Supreme Court upheld the Washington trial court's
use of a protective order under the Washington discovery rule, WASH. SUPER. CT. Crw.
R. 26(c), and not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 34.
However, the ruling in Rhinehart is applicable beyond Washington's borders because
the Washington Rule is identical to Federal Rule 26(c). See Robert C. Post, The
Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 184 ("The
Washington Rule was in fact issued by the Supreme Court of Washington, which
simply copied it verbatim from the federal rule promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court.").
49 See id. at 196 ("[T]he crux of Rhinehart is neither the protection of privacy
interests nor the diminishment of litigants' First Amendment interests, but rather the
Court's perception that discretionary authority to issue restraining orders is essential
for the administration of pretrial discovery.").
"' Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 34-35.
51 Id. at 34.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 37.
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Rhinehart rule did not limit the newspaper's right to publish material
obtained outside of the discovery process, as a practical matter the
ruling severely hampered this possibility because of the difficulty of
proving that subsequently published information had been obtained
by a means other than the discovery process. 5 4 Lower courts have
subsequently defined Rhinehart to uphold protective orders as
consistent with the First Amendment.5
B. The First Amendment, Nonparties and Prior Restraint
Rhinehart established the constitutionality of protective orders
with regard to a First Amendment challenge from parties to the
litigation. When the entity sought to be restrained from disseminat-
ing or publishing the discovery information is not a party to the
litigation, and has acquired the information notwithstanding the
protective order, enforcing a protective order against such an entity
resurrects First Amendment prior restraint analysis. 6 The argument
from the side of First Amendment proponents is simple: a media
nonparty who has acquired newsworthy information is protected by
judicial precedent mandating that "[a]ny prior restraint on expres-
sion comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its
constitutional validity."5"
" See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L.
REV. 457, 460 n.2 (noting that proving the independent procurement of sources in
the publishing context presents difficulties similar to those involved in proving the
independence of sources in criminal cases where a Fourth Amendment violation has
been found).
While the method by which the information was acquired is only a minor point
in Rhinehar, it may play a major role in determining how a protective order is applied
to nonparties. See infra Part III.B.
" See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1986)
(arguing that there is "no room for lower courts to consider [F]irst [A]mendment
factors in fashioning or reviewing Rule 26(c) orders.... [T]he [F]irst [A]mendment
is simply irrelevant to protective orders in civil discovery"); George W. Prescott
Publishing Co. v. Register of Probate, 479 N.E.2d 658, 662 (Mass. 1985) ("Moreover,
the United States Supreme Court has recently held that the impoundment of material
obtained in the course of pretrial discovery, if supported by 'a showing of good cause,'
does not violate the First Amendment." (quoting Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 37)).
11 See Brief of Appellant The McGraw-Hill Companies at 15, Procter & Gamble Co.
v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-4078) [hereinafter Brief of
Appellant The McGraw-Hill Cos.] (arguing that a nonparty publisher who already has
obtained the documents outside the discovery process is a victim of a prior restraint
if a protective order is enforced).
17 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (citations omitted). It
is important to emphasize that Rhinehart does not apply and the protective order
cannot be enforced where the media (or even a media litigant) has obtained the
disputed information independent of the discovery process. See Rhinehar 467 U.S. at 37.
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While the presumption against prior restraint validity is not
absolute, the Supreme Court has indicated that there is an "ex-
tremely narrow class of cases" where the First Amendment will
tolerate a prior restraint. 8 "[O ] nly when the Nation is 'at war, '
or when publication of information such as number and location of
troops is at issue, has a prior restraint been constitutionally appropri-
ate. 0 In fact, the right to publish has prevailed in cases involving
competing interests of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a fair trial,6" a rape victim's claim to confidentiality,62 and
financial harm to a company or business.6"
Moreover, the Court has held that the existence of other post-
publication civil and criminal remedies makes prior restraints even
more constitutionally offensive: "If it can be said that a threat of
criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior
restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time."64 It is therefore arguable
that the media nonparty who has acquired the sealed discovery
information could only be punished post-publication, if at all.6 ' For
the media nonparty with information in hand, the argument goes,
the First Amendment provides all the protection necessary to defeat
the enforcement of a protective order.
66
For the purposes of this Comment the information will be assumed to have been
acquired as part of the discovery process. See infra Part IV.A.1.
58 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971).
5 Id. (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
0 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("No one would question but
that a government might prevent... the publication of... the number and location
of troops." (dictum)).
61 See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562-63 (allowing publication of a criminal
defendant's murder confession).
62 See The Florida Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
' See CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912, 914 (1994) (finding that economic harm
to a business could not justify a prior restraint).
' Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559; see also CBS Inc., 114 S. Ct. at 914
("Subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior restraints, ordinarily are
the appropriate sanction . ..").
I See Brief of Appellant The McGraw-Hill Cos., supra note 56, at 28. For example,
it may be more appropriate to punish the party that leaked the sealed information
than to restrain the media nonparty from publishing. See id. This alternative,
however, provides little consolation to the parties who are affected by the dissemina-
tion and it would have little force if the "source" of the leak were the court itself.
6 See id. at 15.
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II. THE PROTECTIVE ORDER DEBATE:
VALUES IMPLICATED BY NONPARTY DISSEMINATION
Given the Supreme Court's adamant protection of the First
Amendment right against suppression of speech 67 and the perceived
deference granted to trial courts in enforcing protective orders in
light of the First Amendment under Rhinehart, the law is at a
crossroads. A protective order can only be extended until it becomes
an unconstitutional prior restraint, but if it is not extended far
enough, it may lose any force it once had.6" In order to show that,
under certain circumstances, protective orders appropriately bind
media nonparties who have gained access to confidential discovery
materials, this Comment will first examine the policy arguments in
favor of allowing protective orders to bind media nonparties who
have gained such access.
A. Efficiency in Court Process
The substantive value of protective orders is best understood in
relation to their procedural role under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Federal Rules"). The Federal Rules' discovery provisions
were designed to broaden the availability of discovery and to facilitate
the free exchange of relevant information between litigants.69 This
emphasis on broad disclosure led to an increased burden and
expense on both the parties and the courts, thus conflicting with the
Federal Rules' fundamental goal of the "just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."70 Consequently, lower courts and
litigants have increasingly relied on protective orders to restrict the
dissemination of information obtained through discovery, thereby
expediting the process and minimizing the burden of litigating
discovery issues. 71 Moreover, protective orders further the goal of
maximized efficiency of the court process by providing parties with
effective safeguards from "improper" use of discovery.
72
6 See supra Part I.B.
I See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 .Supp. 186, 193 (S.D. Ohio
1995) ("The efficient administration of discovery necessitates that [the trial court] be
able to prevent Business Week from publishing what never would have existed
independently of the discovery process.").
69 See 8 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2002 (1994) (describing the history of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure discovery provisions).70 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
7' See Marcus, supra note 39, at 2.
7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (1983 amendments) ("Thus the
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If parties are unable to rely on the force of a protective order to
seal discovery information, then the orders become valueless. If
parties know that compliance with a discovery request, even with a
protective order, could result in uncontrolled dissemination of private
or financially-valuable information, discovery requests would likely be
contested more frequently to prevent disclosure.7' Given that there
has been a recent proliferation of protective orders'4 and that the
trial courts currently enjoy broad discretion in granting such
orders,75 any diminishment in the effectiveness of protective orders,
either real or apparent, would severely hinder the fundamental goal
of an efficient trial process.
One repercussion of allowing only litigants to rely on the power
of a protective order, thereby undercutting an order's effectiveness,
is the risk that the scope of the discovery process may be curtailed by
the lower courts or the parties if either are persuaded that confiden-
tiality demands such restriction. 76 By limiting the scope of discovery
to protect commercially valuable or private information that cannot
be effectively safeguarded with an order, courts are supported both
by judicial precedent 77 and by the Federal Rules, which explicitly
acknowledge a court's power to refuse discovery requests. 78 Howev-
er, by choosing to limit discovery rather than rely on an ineffective
protective order, the courts would undermine the fundamental
spirit of the rules is violated when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical
weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues by overuse of
discovery or unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses.").
7 See Miller, supra note 11, at 483 ("Limiting the availability of protective orders
makes the discovery process more contentious, protracted and expensive.").
7' See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 . Supp. 866, 889
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (noting that "[p]rotective orders have been used so frequently that
a degree of standardization is appearing").
I See Marcus, supra note 39, at 2 ("The good cause standard gives courts very
broad discretion to tailor protective provisions to fit the needs of the case.").
76 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.431 n.159 (3d ed. 1995) ("If a party
freely disclosed information without contest based on the premise that it would
remain confidential, subsequent dissemination may be unfair and may, in the long
run, reduce other litigants' confidence in protective orders, rendering them less
useful as a tool for preventing discovery abuse and encouraging more strenuous
objections to discovery requests.").
" See In re Sanjuan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that a trial
judge "might well refuse to allow the discovery to proceed at all"); In re Halkin, 598
F.2d 176, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that there is no constitutional right to
discovery).
78 See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) (1) (allowing a lower court to make an order "that the
discovery not be had").
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purpose of discovery, which is to make available the "'[m]utual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties."71
The parties may also frustrate the discovery process by failing to
provide information that otherwise, if disclosed, might have been
protected."' Currently, parties forced into litigation are wary of
opponents who use the trial process for nonlitigation purposes."1
As a result, discovery abuse involving nondisclosure or improper
discovery requests is a difficulty faced by both parties and courts even
with protective orders in place. 2  Litigants' apprehension will
intensify, and failure to comply with discovery will increase if the
effectiveness of the order diminishes.8 3
Another consequence of limiting protective-order enforcement
is the effect it may have on current settlement negotiations.8 4 The
efficient operation of the courts is supported by an independently
valid policy interest in promoting settlement.85 Although it is
questionable whether settlement negotiations are severely affected by
protective orders,86 secrecy can be critical and violation of protec-
tive orders by nonparties will undoubtedly affect opportunities for
settlement. Moreover, opportunity to avoid the negative publicity
associated with disclosing confidential information at trial may be an
inducement to pretrial settlement.8 7 In this situation, where the
settlement proposal is conditioned on the return of the discovered
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (1983 amendments) (quoting
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
s See Marcus, supra note 39, at 21.
81 SeeMarrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F2d 1488, 1495
(7th Cir. 1983) (observing that discovery of confidential information is sometimes
sought for the ulterior motive of forcing the disclosing party "to settle [the suit] in
order not to have to disclose sensitive materials"), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373
(1985).
82 See Marcus, supra note 54, at 486.
1 See Marcus, supra note 39, at 22 ("[A] reliable protective order prohibiting
misuse of information obtained through discovery both placates the person subject to
discovery and reduces the temptation to disregard the obligation to produce the
requested information.").
' See Miller, supra note 11, at 486 (stating that "if the effectiveness of the
protective order cannot be relied on, its capacity to motivate settlement will be
compromised").
I See id.; see also Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 205
(Minn. 1986) (asserting that "[t]he philosophical reasoning behind allowing private
settlements also leads to the conclusion that such agreements should remain private").
I SeeMarcus, supra note 39, at 27 n.112 (noting that the 1970 amendments to the
Federal Rules acknowledge contrary arguments to the settlement debate).
87 See id. at 28 (observing that "[a] party may desire a settlement in part to avoid
a trial at which confidential information will be disclosed").
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materials,88 an effective protective order is invaluable to settlement
negotiations. It would seem even more likely, then, that where both
parties have stipulated to put discovery materials under seal, the
dissemination of the sealed documents by a party outside the
litigation would severely hamper the settlement negotiation process.
If the settlement process is affected, it therefore follows that the
policy of a smooth and efficient judicial process is also disrupted.
B. Privacy Interests in Protective-Order Content
In examining the substantive value of protective orders, the
interest most clearly affected by uncontrolled dissemination by a
nonparty is the litigant's privacy.89  The Supreme Court has
characterized this interest as "a zone of privacy surrounding every
individual, a zone within which the'State may protect him from
intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity."9" The
privacy right of a litigant may be affected because of the nature of
compelled discovery and the lack of a distinction in the Federal
Rules between public and private information.9 1 This is especially
true for a defendant who is "dragged" into court and is then faced
with compulsory disclosure of private information. The Court has
not overlooked this potential for abuse in concluding that litigants
have privacy interests in the information obtained during discovery
and that "[t]he government clearly has a substantial interest in
preventing this sort of abuse of its processes."
9 2
The notion that a litigant does not give up her right of privacy
simply by walking through the courthouse door is also consistent with
I See id. (asserting that "a party is likely to condition his willingness to settle upon
the entry of a court order prohibiting the disclosure of... information obtained
through discovery).
89 See Catherine Yang, Commentary: A Disturbing Trend Toward Secrecy, Bus. WK., Oct.
2, 1995, at 60, 60 ("Companies, of course, have many legitimate reasons for wanting
confidentiality, including the protection of privacy and trade secrets.").
90 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975).
9' See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984) ("The Rules do not
distinguish between public and private information.").
92 Id. The Court also noted that Federal Rule 26(c) does not explicitly reference
privacy interests but that they are "implicit in the broad purpose and language of the
Rule." Id. at 35 n.21.
Rhinehart also suggests that privacy rights encompass information beyond that
which is intuitively "private" such as information regarding financial affairs of
businesses, marketing strategies and other sensitive commercial information. Id. at
26-27 (noting that public release of the donor lists would not only adversely affect the
Aquarian Foundation membership and income but also subject its members to attacks,
threats and additional harassment).
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the traditional purpose of the Federal Rules to facilitate the free
exchange of information.93 In expanding the scope of discovery to
promote access to relevant information, the drafters of the Federal
Rules never intended to undermine the litigant's interest in
privacy.94 Even though a party may have the right to discover
information that is relevant to the allegations made, it does not
follow that the public has a concomitant "right to know" all of the
same information.95 This is why Federal Rule 26(c) indicates that
a lower court has discretion to impose a protective order that may
implicitly protect privacy interests.
9 6
Given that the Court has acknowledged a privacy interest in the
discovered information, and that the Federal Rules are consistent
with this privacy right, the question is reduced to this: Should the
privacy interests of litigants who have agreed to a protective order be
subordinate to the interests of the media nonparty who wishes to
disseminate that information? The media nonparty's interest would
have to be characterized as the "public interest"; the process of
characterizing the media nonparty's interest, however, is problem-
atic.9 7 One would have to define the "public interest" and then
presume that the public has an interest in the information dis-
closed. 8 While the public may have an interest in certain cases,99
it is doubtful that the public has an interest in the technical details
exchanged in most lawsuits.' More significantly, the power to
93 See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 69 and accompanying text.
11 See Miller, supra note 11, at 466 ("The drafters had no intention of using these
procedures to undermine privacy; nor were they expanding discovery in the name of
promoting public access to information.").
9s See David J. Beck & Amy M. Decker, Protective Orders and Confidentiality, in
MANAGING COMPLEX LmGATION 65, 73 (Tort and Ins. Practice Section, ABA ed.,
1992).
9r See FED. RL Crv. P. 26(c) (noting that a court "may make any order" to protect
a litigant from "embarrassment"). The Supreme Court has acknowledged this
justification for imposing a protective order. See Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 35 n.21 (stating
that privacy interests are "implicit" in the protection offered by Federal Rule 26).
" See Miller, supra note 11, at 467 (noting that "public interest" embraces curiosity
and voyeurism as well as legitimate concerns of the public involving, for example,
health and safety).
98 See Marcus, supra note 54, at 479 ("[T]he public's actual interest in information
about other people may not accord with an informed observer's belief about what the
public should find interesting.").
I See id. (noting that the public would more likely be interested in the depositions
in the lawsuit involving Donald and Ivana Trump than they would be in a typical
accident suit).
100 See Miller, supra note 11, at 467 ("The vast majority of litigation is quite
mundane, is exceedingly complex and technical, or deals exclusively with the
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distinguish cases that involve the "public interest" from those cases
that do not would fall into the hands of the court on an ad hoc basis.
Such review would require a court to perform the formidable task of
distinguishing between the "public interest" and the public's mere
curiosity 01
C. Property Rights in Trade Secrets and
Commercially Valuable Information
Uncontrolled dissemination of confidential information by a
media nonparty will also jeopardize the litigants' property rights to
manage their information." 2 Commercially valuable information,
or "intellectual property," has been increasingly considered a
business asset that is closely tied to a business's competitive strate-
gy?"0 Once proprietary information is disclosed to a competitor,
the competitive edge it previously afforded will be lost and trade
secret law will not protect the secret from further dissemination.'
0 4
Proprietary-information owners, then, have a legitimate justification
for seeking enforcement of an effective protective order.
10 5
Given the increased recognition of the proprietary value of
intangible commercially valuable information,10 6 it is not surprising
that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the status of confidential
information as property. 107  This identification of a property
application of arcane principles of law in factual situations far removed from daily
life.").
101 It should also be noted that Congress is in a better position than the courts not
only to identify those situations that may pique the public's interest, but also to
determine when the public interest in dissemination outweighs the privacy interests
of the litigant. See id. at 466 n.203 (noting that the antitrust statutes that make
pretrial antitrust proceedings presumptively public are examples of Congress's ability
to balance these competing interests).
102 See id. at 467.
1o See JAMES HA. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS at xi (1987) (noting that one's
"competitive edge" is closely linked to developing and protecting business information
such as "marketing studies, customer lists and business plans").
See Note, Trade Secrets in Discovery: From First Amendment Disclosure to Fifth
Amendment Protection, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1330, 1330 (1991) [hereinafter Trade Secrets
in Discovery].
105 Some commentators have argued that using discovery in litigation to obtain
confidential information from a competitor can be analogized to a "taking" in the
property context. See id. at 1336-45; see also Gregory Gelfand, 'Taking' Information
Property Through Discovery, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 703 (1988).
1o6 See POOLEY, supra note 103, at xi-xiv (discussing the effects of the technological
revolution on the rise of proprietary data).
... See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (noting that
confidential business information is property); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
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interest in certain information reflects the economic and legal
arguments that property status will promote socially useful behav-
ior.108 Exclusive property rights to commercially valuable informa-
tion, therefore, provide an incentive to develop, trade and produce
such information, which will ultimately benefit others. 09 Further-
more, the dependence of today's economy on the technological
"revolution" and its advances in trading, communicating and
processing information have made confidentiality of proprietary
business information paramount.1
If protective orders were unable to prevent media nonparties
from further dissemination of proprietary information, business
litigants would be incurring costs far beyond those associated with
the expenses of trial.1 ' The uncontrolled dissemination of confi-
dential information by a nonparty threatens not only true trade
secrets on which businesses already rely,"2 but also the development
of proprietary information. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,"' the
Supreme Court noted the importance of confidentiality to research
and development of ideas even though the discovery itself may not
be patentable." 4 The Court posited that the absence of confidenti-
ality in research and development would ultimately undermine the
986, 1003-04 (1984) (arguing that trade secrets constitute property for purposes of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
103 See Gelfand, supra note 105, at 718.
109 See id.
110 SeePOOLEY, supra note 103, at xiii ("Since businesses have relatively equal access
to the raw materials of commerce, their success depends on their abilities to protect
and exploit their technology and other proprietary data.").
. See id. at xii (noting that "[t]he damage to American business from theft of
trade secrets is estimated to exceed $4 billion annually").
112 For instance, the noteworthy trade secret litigation involving the Coca-Cola
Company revolved around a dispute over the formula for the drink, which the
Delaware court acknowledged was "one of the best-kept trade secrets in the world."
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985). The
court expressed concern about protecting the secret formula from disclosure outside
the direct litigation process. See id. at 294.
us 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
114 See id. at 485.
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most efficient methods of technological innovation." 5  Further-
more, litigants always face the risk that competitors are filing lawsuits
primarily to gain access to confidential proprietary information.11
In such a scenario, it is immaterial whether the business filing the
suit desires the information for itself or whether it simply wants to
injure the competitor through public release of the information.'17
From the perspective of the litigant seeking protection, release of the
protected information would be invidious regardless of whether it
was disseminated by the opposing litigant or a nonparty.
The property interests of a litigant, along with the litigant's
privacy concerns and the court's efficiency needs, provide a glimpse
of the interests possibly implicated by failing to prevent protective
orders from being enforced against nonparties which have acquired,
legally or illegally, confidential information. The interests implicated
suggest that protective orders should be extended to prevent nonparty
dissemination. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that legal
precedent provides lower courts with the power to enforce such
orders against nonparties.1n Rhinehart was limited to the proposi-
tion that protective orders could withstand a First Amendment
challenge in their enforcement against parties to the litigation." 9
Lower courts must therefore search beyond Rhinehart for legal
authority to justify enforcing a protective order against nonparties.
"s See id. at 486. The Court eloquently stated that if trade secret protection were
limited:
The innovative entrepreneur with limited resources would tend to confine
his research efforts to himself and those few he felt he could trust without
the ultimate assurance of legal protection against breaches of confidence.
As a result, organized scientific and technological research could become
fragmented, and society, as a whole, would suffer.
Id.
11 See Miller, supra note 11, at 471.
"1 See e.g., Litton Indus., Inc. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 129 F.R.D. 528, 531
(E.D. Wis. 1990) (denying the discovery of certain documents that would provide an
advantage to the litigant's competitors and harm its customer relations).
118 See supra Part I.B.
"I See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) ("J]udicial
limitations on apary'sability to disseminate information discovered in advance of trial
implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a far lesser extent
than would restraints on dissemination of information in a different context."
(emphasis added)).
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III. LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR PROTECTING
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FROM NONPARTY DISCLOSURE
Though the Supreme Court has made it clear that protective
orders prohibiting dissemination by parties in litigation are "unique"
in their relation to the First Amendment, 12 it is not clear that the
First Amendment will permit protective orders to bar nonparties
from publication.121 Indeed, in Bridges v. California,122 the Su-
preme Court imposed stringent limitations on a trial judge's capacity
to regulate the out-of-court speech of nonparties.1 23 If dissemina-
tion of protective-order material by a nonparty is regarded as
"speech," then the legal justification for protective-order enforce-
ment against nonparties must contend with the First Amendment.
120 See id.
121 See Brief of Appellant The McGraw-Hill Cos., supra note 56, at 29 ("Thus, the
Supreme Court's holding [in Rhinehart] goes only to the question of access, and does
not address the wholly unrelated question ... of the right of a non-party---including
the media-to publish information which is already in its possession.").
814 U.S. 252 (1941).
' See id. at 268 ("History affords no support for the contention that the criteria
applicable under the Constitution to other types of utterances are not applicable, in
contempt proceedings, to out-of-court publications pertaining to a pending case.").
Note that the particular out-of-court speech disputed in Bridges involved editorials
commenting upon cases pending in state court. Id. at 258, 271. It does not answer
the question discussed in this Comment involving the nonparty dissemination of
material directly obtained from a protective order.
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), the Supreme
Court addressed an issue more analogous to the publication of material obtained from
confidential proceedings. In Landmark, the Court suggested that while the State may
control access to certain confidential proceedings, the First Amendment may prohibit
barring the publication of information obtained from those proceedings. See id. at
837-38.
Landmark, however, is distinguishable for a number of reasons. The Court
emphasized that a "'major purpose'" of the First Amendment is "'to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.'" Id. at 838 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 884 U.S.
214, 218 (1966)). Protective orders in the civil-discovery context, however,
infrequently involve "governmental affairs," but rather involve the business concerns
of private litigants. See Richard B. Schmitt, Critics Say Courts Seal Too Much Data, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at B1 ("More business information is being kept from the public
under court seal. . .).
Furthermore, the Court noted that the confidential judicial review proceedings
were "a matter of public interest, necessarily engaging the attention of the news
media." Landmark, 435 U.S. at 839. It is debatable, however, whether information
sealed under a protective order is a matter of "public interest." See supra notes 97-101
and accompanying text.
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A. Confidential Discovery Materials and the
Property-Versus-Speech Debate
Underlying the First Amendment prior restraint cases124 is the
notion that the expression and communication of ideas should not
be suppressed.'25 Therefore, any injunction against a media non-
party from disseminating protective-order material "bear [s] a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity."' 21 Where free
speech concerns collide with private property interests in informa-
tion, however, the Supreme Court has attempted to carve out
protection consistent with the First Amendment for legitimate
property interests.1 27 Property interests in confidential discovery
materials, therefore, form the basis for extending protective-order
enforcement to media nonlitigants.
1. Restraints Based upon Copyright Protection
In New York Times Co. v. United States,'28 a seminal First Amend-
ment case holding that an injunction prohibiting the newspaper from
publishing a classified government study on the Vietnam War was an
unconstitutional prior restraint, two concurring opinions acknowl-
edged the unique role of copyright protection in relation to the First
Amendment. 129 In particular, Justice White noted that Article 1,
Section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to secure the
"exclusive right" of authors to their writings, "and no one denies that
a newspaper can properly be enjoined from publishing the copyright-
ed works of another."' Justice White distinguished injunctions
under the copyright laws from other prior restraints by noting that
these situations are based on the complaint of a private copyright
holder enforcing her statutorily enforced private right.'' Injunc-
124 See supra Part I.B.
12 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978) ("[P]ower
in government to channel the expression of views is unacceptable under the First
Amendment.").
126 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
12 See infra Part III.A.3.
'2 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
'- See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726 n.* (Brennan,J., concurring) ("Similarly,
copyright cases have no pertinence here: the Government is not asserting an interest
in the particular form of words chosen in the documents, but is seeking to suppress
the ideas expressed therein. And the copyright laws, of course, protect only the form
of expression and not the ideas expressed."); see also id. at 731 n.1 (White, J.,
concurring).
130 Id.
' See id. Since 1978, all copyright matters have been governed by federal law
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tions based on copyright are therefore presumed not to violate the
First Amendment.
13 2
Copyright protection is consistent with free speech because it
extends only to the particular form in which thoughts or concepts
are expressed and not the thoughts or concepts themselves.
1 33
Consequently, as long as others express themselves in a different
manner, the information and ideas of the copyright holder may be
expressed without offending the copyright protection.1 34  More-
over, copyright protection is constitutionally established under
Article I, Section 8, which authorizes Congress to secure the exclusive
right of authors to their writings.1 35  Copyright protection thus
provides a good focal point for examining the force of the propri-
etary interest in confidential discovery information.
The potential for extending a copyright argument to the
exchange of discovery material was explored at the district court level
in Honda Research & Dev. Co. v. Loveall 136  Loveall, the plaintiff,
originally brought a tort action against Honda in state court for an
injury sustained while riding an all-terrain cycle. During discovery,
the plaintiff requested information on the design, specifications,
testing, developmental techniques and components of the vehicle
from the defendant company, Honda.1 37  In response, Honda
sought and obtained a protective order to cover competitively
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810. Note that under federal copyright law, a copyright owner
has the exclusive rights to reproduce the copyrighted work and to distribute copies
or derivatives of the copyrighted work to others. See Robert J. Jacobson, Protecting
Discovery by Copyright, 71 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SoC'Y, 483, 487-88 (1989). To
benefit from copyright protection, however, the litigants would have to register
confidential material before or upon receiving the protective order. See id.
'12 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 666 (1992).
'3 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726 n.* (noting that copyright cases were
inapplicable since the Government was seeking to suppress the ideas rather than the
words chosen to express the ideas).
134 See Zimmerman, supra note 132, at 666.
' U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have [the] Power... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
Because Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, secures the rights of inventors to their
respective discoveries, see id., the Court should encounter little difficulty in distin-
guishing the constitutional validity of injunctions based on patent protection from
those based on copyright protection.
'- 687 E Supp. 355 (E.D. Tenn. 1985). For an extensive look at this case and a
general background on the subject of copyright, seeJacobson, supra note 131.
"I See Loveall v. American Honda Motor Co., 694 S.W.2d 937, 938-39 (Tenn.
1985).
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sensitive information. 8  Honda was not satisfied with pretrial
protection, however, so it sought further restrictions on the sharing
of evidence introduced at trial"9 by filing a complaint in federal
district court seeking injunctive relief pursuant to the federal
copyright laws.
140
Honda exercised its rights as a copyright owner because it had
registered the disputed documents as unpublished works under a
"special relief' provision made to the United States Register of
Copyrights. 4 ' The district court agreed with Honda and issued a
preliminary injunction-eventually a permanent injunc-
tion-enjoining the state court plaintiff's attorneys and others from
releasing for publication or inclusion in the public record the
copyrighted documents. 142 In issuing the preliminary injunction,
the district court pointed out that Honda, like any copyright owner,
"has the exclusive rights to reproduce the copyrighted documents, to
prepare derivative works from the copyrighted documents, and to
distribute copies of the copyrighted documents to others." 43
Lending substantial support to the district court was the seminal
Supreme Court case Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterpris-
es,144 which held that exclusive copyright protection included the
right to control the first public distribution of the copyrighted
documents, as well as the choice of whether to make the material
public at all. 45
Crucial to the analysis of the Loveall decision was that the "fair
use" defense, a statutory defense to an allegation of copyright
infringement, 46 was inapplicable to Honda's claim of copyright
protection. The district court sidestepped the fair use issue,
however, by recognizing that it was of little substance when applied
to confidential, unpublished works, such as the discovery documents
sought in Loveall'47 The district court again cited Harper &
"8s Id. at.940.
139 SeeJacobson, supra note 131, at 486.
"4o See Loveal4 687 F. Supp. at 356.
141 See id. at 357.
142 See id.
"'4Jacobson, supra note 131, at 491.
1- 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
'4 See id. at 555, 564.
14 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
147 SeeJacobson, supra note 131, at 492.
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Row,'48 which noted that publication of a work is a "critical ele-
ment" in the fair use defense.
49
While the Loveall decision supports the idea of providing litigants
with additional protection for confidential information exchanged
during the discovery process, it also serves as an avenue for extend-
ing protective-order enforcement to media nonlitigants. Although
Honda was granted a protective order to protect its confidential
business information, the protective order lost its force upon the
introduction of the information in the trial record. 50 Faced with
the prospect of competitively sensitive information becoming public
in the trial record, Honda successfully used federal copyright
doctrine to keep the material out of the trial record and out of
competitors' hands.
Copyright registration under the special relief provision used by
Honda is also available for documents that are neither technical nor
highly secret. A special relief request may be granted for mere
"confidentiality."' Provided that litigants, like Honda, take the
necessary steps to copyright documents, they should likewise be able
to use copyright arguments to protect the use or disclosure of
confidential material exchanged during discovery. It follows that if
a protective order has been issued that covers copyrighted material,
and a media nonlitigant nonetheless obtains the information, a
litigant should be able to secure the enforcement of the protective
order against the nonlitigant using copyright arguments.
2. Trade Secret Status and Takings Analysis
While federal copyright protection has frequently been accepted
as consistent with the First Amendment, doctrinal complexities
develop when the analysis extends to other forms of intangible
property that also implicate free speech.5 2  In Ruckeishaus v.
Monsanto Co.,' the Supreme Court determined that trade secrets
constituted "property" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's
14 See Lovea, 687 . Supp. at 359.
14 471 U.S. at 564.
' See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) (holding that a
protective order's validity depended on its being narrowly drawn to "the context of
pretrial civil discovery").
5I See Jacobson, supra note 131, at 488 (citing COMPENDIUM II OF COPYRIGHT
OFFIcES PRACTICES § 808.03(a) (1984)).
152 See Zimmerman, supra note 132, at 666-67.
153 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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Takings Clause."' The fact that the Court affirmed the proprietary
interest in trade secrets was uncontroversial. 15 To recognize the
Fifth Amendment interest in trade secrets, however, acknowledged
the judicial role in preventing the state from taking "private property
.. for public use without just compensation." 1 6 Considering that
courts are "state actors" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, 57
and that the state or federal government uses its coercive power to
enforce discovery requests,"5 " a court's failure to adequately en-
force a protective order sealing valuable trade secrets arguably
initiates a takings analysis. 59
In Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court outlined four general steps
that are to be followed to determine if a taking has occurred.16
First, a court must determine if the item affected is "property."
Second, the state actor must have "taken" it. Third, the taking must
be for a "public purpose," as takings for a private purpose are
constitutionally forbidden. Finally, if a taking has occurred for a
public purpose, the owner must have received "just compensa-
tion."
161
a. Trade Secrets as Property
As noted above, the Supreme Court unanimously held in
Ruckelshaus that trade secrets are property protected by the Fifth
Amendment and cannot be taken against an owner's will without just
compensation. 61 In Ruckelshaus, the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") use of
information that a company manufacturing agricultural chemical
products disclosed to the agency pursuant to a legislative act. In
determining that the company had a Fifth Amendment interest in
the information disclosed to the EPA, the Court noted that property
5 See id. at 1003-04.
155 See Gelfand, supra note 105, at 720 (noting that reported cases treating trade
secrets as property "extend back to the late 1700s").
-6 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"I See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-35 (1897) (applying the
Takings Clause to the Illinois judiciary).
' See Trade Secrets in Discovery, supra note 104, at 1337.
See Gelfand, supra note 105, at 710 n.32 (suggesting that while no taking occurs
where trade secrets are exchanged in discovery pursuant to a protective order, "a
significant problem remains.., because courts cannot effectively guarantee that trade
secret protective orders will be followed").
1' See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-01 (1984).
161 See id.
162 See id. at 1008-04.
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interests "'are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law."'163 The Court then looked to Missouri law to define a trade
secret as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
that is used in one's business, and that gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it."," Other commentators have persuasively argued, however, that
state law cannot be the real source of this decision because that
would allow a state to be the "final arbiter of the Constitution." 165
Rather, the "independent source" in Ruckelshaus reflected the broad
consensus that trade secrets are to be considered property. 66
Reliance on a broader consensus for the definition of property
rights is ajudicially recognized practice and was recently affirmed in
Carpenter v. United States.67 In Carpenter, the Court acknowledged
a newspaper's property rights in its "confidential business informa-
tion" which was misappropriated from the newspaper and traded
upon by a reporter and stockbroker. 66 What is remarkable about
this holding is that it was not based upon trade secret statutes or
restatements, but rather upon the Court's acknowledgement of its
own dicta from previous cases. 69 This provides ample support for
the argument that the Ruckelshaus Court relied on the general
consensus that trade secrets constitute property, thus allowing the
Court to recognize it "as a matter of constitutional judicially created
law."70 The subtle extension to "confidential business informa-
tion" in Carpenter reflects the exercise of this notion.
The Court noted that the Takings Clause has long been
interpreted as construing a broad definition of property not
restricted to "'its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing
with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by
11s Id. at 1001 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 161 (1980)).
11 Id. (relying on the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939)).
165 Gelfand, supra note 105, at 713.
See id. at 721 n.76 (listing federal statutes that recognize the proprietary interest
in trade secrets). Indeed, the majority of states now follow § 757 of the First
Restatement of Torts defining trade secrets, while 16 states have adopted similar
wording announced in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. See id. at 722.
167 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
'~ Id. at 27-28.
169 See id. at 26 (citing cases in which the Court apparently has "long" recognized
the property interest in "[clonfidential business information").
170 Gelfand, supra note 105, at 712.
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law." ' ' Thus, in affirming the proprietary interest in trade secret
information, the Court recognized the general perception, and
adopted as its own view, that the intangible nature of trade secrets
should not deprive them of the constitutional protection allotted to
tangible property.
17 2
b. Violation of Protective Orders as "Taking" Property
To determine whether a "taking" has occurred depends on the
degree to which the state actor deprives the owner of his property
interest. 73 While no clear formula determines whether a taking
has occurred, "'[i]f the property owner loses too many important
sticks from his bundle, his property has been taken."'"74 Therefore,
a taking will almost surely be found where there is a complete
appropriation of property such that the owner is unable to gain any
benefit from it.'75
With regard to trade secrets, the Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus
noted that the substantive value of the trade secret property interest
was determined by the degree to which it was kept confidential.'7 6
Therefore, in the context of discovery, disclosure to competitors
would generally constitute a taking because it eliminates the
competitive advantage associated with the secret and undermines the
owner's ability to protect her property interest.177  Some have
argued that, in theory, carefully crafted protective orders that limit
access to trade secrets to opposing litigants, and prevent the
dissemination of trade secrets to third parties, will prevent a taking
from occurring. 78 This theory has persuaded some courts, and
'x7 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (quoting United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)).
11 See id. (noting that, like trade secrets, "the Court has found other kinds of
intangible interests to be property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Taking
Clause").
" See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("One fact for
consideration in determining [limitations on the state's police power] is the extent
of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.")
11 Gelfand, supra note 105, at 725 (quoting Note, Federal Disclosure Statutes and the
Fiftlh Amendment: The New Status of Trade Secrets, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 334, 342 (1987)).
175 See Trade Secrets in Discovery, supra note 104, at 1341.
176 See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002 ("[T]he extent of the property right therein
is defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from
disclosure to others.").
17 See Trade Secrets in Discovery, supra note 104, at 1342.
178 See Gelfand, supra note 105, at 734.
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they have held that protective orders may obviate the need for a
takings analysis.
179
Protective orders will not prevent unconstitutional takings,
however, if they are ineffective.' When a court, under the Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a company to disclose a trade
secret to an opposing litigant, the subsequent disclosure of that trade
secret to third parties who are not also bound by the protective order
would, presumably, result in a taking. As the Court noted in
Ruckelshaus, "[i]f an individual discloses his trade secret to others
who are under no obligation to protect the confidentiality of the
information, or otherwise publicly discloses the secret, his property
right is extinguished."' Therefore, although an opposing litigant
may be obligated to protect the confidentiality of the trade secret
pursuant to the protective order, the subsequent disclosure to a third
party who is not so bound would constitute "public disclosure," thus
eliminating the proprietary interest in the trade secret and resulting
in a taking.
Moreover, the reasoning of Carpenter comports with the theory
that a protective-order violation, by any party privy to the information,
would cause harm in the form of lost property rights to the trade
secret owner. 2 In upholding the convictions of the reporter and
stockbroker who traded. on the newspaper's "confidential business
information," the Carpenter Court noted that determinable monetary
loss was unnecessary: "[I]t is sufficient that the [party] has been
deprived of its right to exclusive use of the information, for exclusivi-
ty is an important aspect of confidential business information
.... "183 Thus, a litigant who is already at risk when she discloses
confidential business information under a protective order, is in
further jeopardy when a nonparty acquires and seeks to disseminate
the information. 4
11 See, e.g., St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 107 ERD. 398, 401 (D.
Minn. 1985) (holding that because "attorneys realize their ethical obligations extend
to the overseeing of appropriate security measures" a protective order will effectively
prevent disclosure of trade secrets).
"1 Cf Trade Secrets in Discovery, supra note 104, at 1342 ("Discovery of trade secrets
in the absence of disclosure to third parties, however, would not be a taking if the court
crafted a protective order to preserve a significant portion of the owner's rights."
(emphasis added)).
"'a Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984).
18 See Trade Secrets in Discovery, supra note 104, at 1343-44 (noting that California
enacted legislation recognizing the property interests of trade secret owners whose
secrets were exposed at trial).
'a' Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1987).
' It is important to note that confidential business information does not lose its
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c. The Public Use Requirement
Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, it will
constitutionally validate the taking only if it serves a public purpose
and the owner receives 'Just compensation."185 Trade secrets
disclosed pursuant to a protective order and subsequently obtained
by a media nonlitigant would seem to constitute private use in
violation of this requirement. In practice, however, it would be very
difficult to persuade a court that the public use requirement has not
been met. While the primary beneficiary of the violation of the
protective order may theoretically be the media nonlitigant, the
courts have generally held that even an attenuated benefit to the
public may be enough to constitute a "public purpose."'8 6 There-
fore, even the existence of a slightly probative "public interest" in the
disputed discovery material would probably fulfill the public use
requirement for constitutional jurisprudence.1
87
d. The Failure ofJust Compensation and the Need for Alternative
Remedies
Just compensation requires that if a taking does occur, as in the
case where a protective order fails to prevent disclosure to a media
nonlitigant, the owner should receive the market value of the
property.188 The compensation provision raises several derivative
issues, however, when a protective order fails to protect trade secrets.
First, in the event of unconsented disclosure to a media nonlitigant,
who should be responsible for payment to the trade secret owner?
Because the "taking" occurs at the initial stage when the state actor
coerces the process of discovery, the court should be primarily
property status when it is acquired by a media nonparty to a litigation, as long as the
party seeking the property status did not disclose the information. See I R. MILGRIM,
TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[2] (1983). Milgrim notes that trade secrets only lose their
status as "secrets" if they are disclosed to one who is under no obligation to protect
the confidences of the information. See id. If the media nonparty acquires the
information from the opposing party, or acquires it through its own illegitimate
means, then trade secret status still applies.
'85 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001.
"1 See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,
458 (Mich. 1981) (allowing the State of Michigan to condemn an entire neighbor-
hood so that General Motors could build a new factory and finding a public purpose
in the economic benefits to the public).
7 See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
'8 See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (noting that just
compensation is normally measured by the market value at the time of the taking).
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responsible for compensation. However, since courts neither possess
the funds nor the willingness to pay for a taking, most commentators
suggest that judicial takings must be invalidated outright.8 9 These
commentators suggest that once it is established that disclosure of
trade secrets will occur in discovery, the court could avoid a taking
by denying discovery altogether or by using protective orders.1 9
The use of protective orders to prevent a Fifth Amendment violation,
however, provides little solace to the litigant who relied on an order
which failed to prevent third-party disclosure.
One alternative would be to have the party who disclosed the
information to the media nonlitigant compensate for the violation.
There are several problems with this option. If a party violated an
order and disclosed a trade secret, proof of that violation would
frequently be difficult to establish.' 9' Furthermore, a media
nonlitigant may obtain protective-order information with neither
party's assistance. Rather, the information may be acquired directly
from the court itself. 92
Moreover, requiring compensation from the party who was
responsible for disseminating the protected material creates a more
perplexing issue: it assumes that "just compensation" can be fairly
determined. Trade secrets are ambiguous by nature. 193  Some
litigants will have proprietary interests in commercial data which they
have yet to quantify.'94 Furthermore, some proprietary informa-
tion, such as the "confidential business information" of Carpenter,
"s' See Gelfand, supra note 105, at 731; Trade Secrets in Discovery, supra note 104, at
1343.
"I' See Gelfand, supra note 105, at 732 (suggesting that reading Rule 26 as
requiring protective orders when trade secrets are involved in discovery, as opposed
to making it a discretionary power, could be a viable alternative).
"' For instance, media nonparties will rarely be willing to compromise their
confidential sources. See Claudia MacLachlan, Did Business Week Fold Too Easily., NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, atAl, A21 ("'If ajournalist makes a promise to a source, you don't
break it, period.'" (quoting Jane E. Kirtley, Executive Director of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press)).
In the Business Week case, for example, a Business Weekjournalist was unwilling to
directly name the source of the confidential discovery documents but apparently
provided enough clues to reveal the source's identity. See id.
192 This situation could arise either when a court clerk accidentally disseminates
the protected information to a media nonlitigant, when a media nonlitigant obtains
the information under false pretenses, or when the information is simply mailed to
the wrong address.
193 See Marcus, supra note 54, at 490 (noting the "elasticity of the definition of a
trade secret").
1' See POOLEY, supra note 103, at 7-8 (pointing out ways in which companies can
go about identifying their proprietary information).
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cannot be fairly evaluated in monetary terms, but rather must be
identified in terms of its "exclusive use."'95 More importantly,
some trade secrets, although clearly identifiable, could never be
adequately replaced through a compensation remedy.9
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause in the context of trade
secrets demonstrates how property rules will inevitably conflict with
First Amendment concerns when protective-order information is
acquired by a media nonlitigant. Because the Court has endorsed
the use of injunctions to protect such intangible property rights,'97
this remedy should not be disregarded simply because the party
affected is a media nonlitigant. In fact, allowing the use of injunc-
tions as an alternative remedy would strengthen the enforcement
power of a protective order, further protect trade secret owners'
legitimate property interests, and thereby deter other unconstitution-
al takings from occurring.
3. Balancing Property Interests with First Amendment Concerns
It is arguable that the property interest in the information
covered by a protective order demands that the regulation of such
material be held to a different standard than that to which other
forms of expression are held. TWo Supreme Court cases that directly
confront the property-versus-First Amendment issue illustrate this
notion. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee ("SFAA"),198 the Supreme Court confronted a challenge
to Congressional legislation that granted the United States Olympic
Committee ("USOC") the right to prohibit certain commercial and
promotional uses of the word "Olympic" and various Olympic
symbols. 99 The petitioner, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.,
"-' Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1987) (arguing that "exclusivity
is an important aspect of confidential business information and most private property
for that matter").
"I See Gelfand, supra note 105, at 734 n.117 (arguing that "no remedy could ever
replace the exclusivity that now exists with regard to, for example, the formula for
Coca-Cola").
" See, e.g., Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26 (arguing that where a corporation has the
exclusive property right to its confidential business information, a court of equity
"'will protect [the property interest] through the injunctive process or other
appropriate remedy'" (quoting 3 LENORE M. ZAJDEL, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.1 (rev. vol. 1986))).
198 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
See id. at 526-28. The challenged legislation was § 110 of the Amateur Sports
Act, 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1994). See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 526.
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challenged the USOC's property right in the word and symbols, in
part on its inconsistency with the First Amendment.
20
In upholding the statute and the property interest, the Court
acknowledged that the risk of suppressing ideas "always has been
balanced against the principle that when a word acquires value 'as
the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and
money' by an entity, that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited
property right in the word." 201 The Court in SFAA clearly engaged
in this balancing, opening its analysis with a discussion of the
desirability of trademark protection "'because trademarks foster
competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the
producer the benefits of good reputation. '"202 While the Court's
holding in SFAA reinforces the Lanham Act,20 3 which defines
trademark protection, it also demonstrates the Court's interest in
protecting proprietary interests from inappropriate infringement. In
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,204 the Court addressed a
claim of damages by a performer whose act-being shot from a
cannon as a "human cannonball"-was recorded on film and
broadcast on a news program. While the claimed proprietary interest
was a common law "right of publicity,"2 5 the Court, in upholding
the performer's claim, found support in the fact that the interest was
"closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law."
20 1
Protecting the interest, therefore, had "'a decidedly beneficial effect
on society. '"207 The Court was unpersuaded by arguments that the
First Amendment would excuse this property right infringement on
grounds of public entertainment and newsworthiness.
200
20 See id. at 527-28.
201 Id. at 532 (quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
239 (1918)).
202 Id. at 531 (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198
(1985)).
203 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994).
20 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
205 Id. at 575.
206 Id. at 573. Thus, the focus was on "the right of the individual to reap the
reward of his endeavors and [had] little to do with protecting feelings or reputation."
Id.
20 Id. at 578 n.13 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485
(1974)). The Supreme Court has noted that the economic philosophy behind the
constitutional clause empowering Congress to grant patents 2ind copyrights is "the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors." Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
20 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
1996] 2493
2494 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 2463
Zacchini supports the proposition that certain intangible property
interests, such as the right to confidential business information,
deserve protection even in the face of First Amendment interests.
2 9
The theory that information covered by a protective order will affect
property interests is thus crucial to the argument that protective
orders should be legally enforceable against media nonlitigants who
have acquired sealed information. The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged the predominance of a "limited property right" once that right
has been established:210  where a corporation has the exclusive
property right to its confidential business information, a lower court
"'will protect [the property interest] through the injunctive process
or other appropriate remedy."' 211 Establishing a private property
interest in protective-order material, therefore, lessens the signifi-
cance of a First Amendment challenge.
B. Enforcing Protective Orders Against Nonparties Through the
Injunctive Powers of the Courts
Even if the First Amendment does not provide an obstacle to an
injunction against a media nonparty who had acquired access to
confidential discovery materials, the court may still have to determine
whether it has authority to enforce its orders by injunction against
nonparties to the litigation.212 Rule 26(c) (7) fails to provide
20 Perhaps significantly, the Zacchini Court pointed out that the claimant sought
damages for the broadcast of his "act" without his consent, rather than seeking an
injunction prior to the broadcast itself. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578 ("[N] either the
public nor [the news program] will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner's
performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized.
Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply wants
to be paid for it."). Lower courts, however, have subsequently cited Zacchini as
approval of the "right of publicity," while simultaneously granting injunctive relief to
protect this property interest. See, e.g., Martin Luther King,Jr., Ctr. for Social Change,
Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 679-80 (11th Cir. 1983)
(reversing denial of injunction for violation of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s right of
publicity); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 442, 444 (1st Cir.
1985) (affirming lower court's choice of law in granting injunctive relief to prevent
distribution of posters depicting certain popular music performers).
210 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1987) (acknowledging a
newspaper's rights in its "confidential business information"); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (holding that trade secrets are considered
property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Takings clause); cf. Zimmerman, supra
note 132, at 724 ("'J]udges have sometimes found in the flexibility offered by the
term "property" a congenial opportunity to do what the First Amendment forbids-
censor, or at least harry, speech they find offensive, unfair, or unworthy.").
211 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26 (quoting 3 LENORE M. ZAJDEL, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.1 (rev. vol. 1986)).
212 See Brief of Appellant The McGraw-Hill Cos., supra note 56, at 37-38.
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guidance on the issues of who is bound by a protective order and
what penalties should apply in the event of its violation. 21" At least
one court has found that regardless of whether the protective order
contained statements specifically binding the nonparty to the
protective order,214 the court may punish the nonparty violator of
the protective order under its injunctive powers.215 More impor-
tantly, if a court wishes to prevent or restrain dissemination of court-
protected confidential information that is already in the hands of a
media nonparty, an injunction is the appropriate tool.216 There-
fore, the scope of a court's injunctive powers must be analyzed with
regard to a media nonparty.
1. Scope of Injunctive Power Under Rule 65(d)
While the early development of the law of injunctions bound only
the parties to the suit, courts recognized that binding only those
present in court would inadequately protect the interests of those
who had secured the injunction.217 The law thus developed to bind
nonparties to the extent that the nonparty's act was tantamount to
an act of a party.218 Judge Learned Hand defined this development
when he argued that where "a person ... knowingly assists a
defendant in violating an injunction [that person] subjects himself
Significantly, given the property status of confidential business information
asserted in Carpenter, a litigant may have a private claim against the media nonparty
who has acquired the information in spite of the protective order. This inquiry,
however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
213 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c) (7); see also Nancy L. Krzton, Note, Due Process Concerns
in Discovery: Who May Protective Orders Bind , 44 U. PITr. L. REv. 1081, 1083 (1983).
214 See Krzton, supra note 218, at 1083.
215 See Quinter v. Volkswagen of Am., 676 F2d 969, 972 (1982) (observing that the
nonparty "need not be expressly named in the Protective Order in order to be held
liable for civil contempt").
211 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F Supp. 186, 192 (S.D.
Ohio 1995) (discussing the test that must be met in order for an injunction to be a
proper remedy).
217 See Hutcheson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 480 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 1992) (noting that
upholding an injunction against a nonparty was a "logical extension" of the law as it
evolved during some of the "turn-of-the-century cases"); State v. Terry, 168 P. 513, 515
(Wash. 1917) ("Though appellant was not a party to the decree and was never served
with a copy of it, her actual knowledge of the injunction renders her liable to
punishment for contempt in violating it."); see also Note, Binding Nonparties to
Injunction Decrees, 49 MINN. L. REV. 719, 719 (1965).
21 See Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930) ("[T]he only
occasion when a person not a party may be punished, is when he has helped to bring
about, not merely what the decree has forbidden, because it may have gone too far,
but what it has power to forbid, an act of a party.").
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to civil as well as criminal proceedings for contempt."219 Though
this expansion of the law of injunctions appears quite straightfor-
ward, it has become difficult to apply in practice. 220 Using phrases
such as "independent interest" or "independent activity" to define
when a nonparty does not violate an injunction,221 the clarity in
injunctive law has suffered under the usage of its various terms.222
Despite the malleability of the terms guiding injunctive law, a
good starting point for an examination of the boundaries of a federal
court's injunctive power is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)
("Rule 65(d)"). 22' Rule 65(d) states in relevant part: "Every order
granting an injunction and every restraining order ... is binding
only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert
or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by
personal service or otherwise." 224 Rule 65(d) has thus been inter-
preted to incorporate the underlying policy that the order cannot be
"'so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons who act
independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according to
law. '"225
Applying the policy of Rule 65 (d) to protective orders and media
nonparties possessing court-protected confidential information poses
two issues: 1) does "acting independently" implicate the method used
by the media nonparty to acquire the information; and 2) does it
take into account when the media nonparty had knowledge of the
protective order? The method used to acquire the confidential
219 Id. at 832.
22 See Doug Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to Injunctions, 53 TEX. L. REV.
873, 878-79 (1975) (noting that the law regarding persons bound by injunctions has
been littered with ambiguous terms and is difficult to apply).
221 See, e.g., Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13 (1945) (disallowing
injunctions which punish the conduct of persons "who act independently and whose
rights have not been adjudged according to law"); see also Rendleman, supra note 220,
at 880.
See Rendleman, supra note 220, at 878-79.
See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973) (discussing
Rule 65(d) injunctions generally); Regal Knitwear Co., 324 U.S. at 14 (discussing Rule
65(d) injunctions as analogous to an NLRB cease-and-desist order).
224 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d). "Actual notice" of the injunction is a prerequisite to
binding both "those persons in active concert or participation with them." Id. The
alleged violator of the injunction, however, need not have been served if the
"knowledge" came from another source, such as word of mouth, newspaper, or other
forms of notice. See Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, supra note 217, at 720.
225 Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 180 (quoting Regal Knitwear Co., 324 U.S.
at 13) (emphasis added).
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
information must be given proper weight in order, to enjoin, for
example, the media nonparty who purchases the court-protected
information from a litigant or the courthouse itself.226  Moreover,
assessing injunctive power based upon actual knowledge of the
protective order must vary temporally in order to protect the due
process rights of the media nonparty who gathers information and
only later is apprised of its protected status. While neither of these
issues will definitively answer whether the media nonparty acted
"independently" for purposes of injunctive law, they do delineate a
center of focus: whether the nonparty was acting "independently"
when the confidential information was acquired.
Considering the manner in which the information is acquired is
consistent with several Supreme Court opinions. In those cases,
which involved prior restraints, the Court suggested that the level of
First Amendment protection afforded to the media may depend on
how the information was obtained. 221 More significantly, focusing
26 These methods implicate other legal consequences, such as judicial discipline
or penalties for bribery.
I Although the Court has not settled the issue of whether a newspaper that uses
unlawful means to acquire information may be punished prior to publication of that
information, several opinions suggest this proposition. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 617 (Stevens,J., concurring) (reservingjudgment on "[w]hether
the same absolute [First Amendment] protection would apply no matter how shabby
or illegal the means by which the information is obtained"); see also McGraw-Hill Cos.
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6, 7 (1995) (mem.) (noting that "the manner in
which [a news magazine] came into possession of the information it seeks to publish
may have a bearing on its right to do so"). Several Court opinions, however, expressly
reserve judgment on the issue. See, e.g., Florida Star v. BJ.F, 491 U.S. 524, 534 n.8
(1989) ("The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government
may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as
well."); CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912, 914 (1994) (suggesting that it is undecided
whether "criminal activity by the broadcaster could justify an exception to the prior
restraint doctrine under some circumstances"); Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978) ("We are not here concerned with the possible
applicability of the statute to one who secures the information by illegal means and
thereafter divulges it.").
One FirstAmendment expert has even noted that some members of the Supreme
Court may be swayed if a media party misappropriated or bought the information, and
that if the information was literally stolen, "it would be problematic." MacLachlan,
supra note 191, at A21.
But see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), where it was
apparently contested that the confidential documents were "feloniously acquired"
from the Pentagon, yet the majority of the Court said the prior restraint could not be
upheld. See id. at 714; see also CBS Inc., 114 S. Ct. at 914 ("Nor is the prior restraint
doctrine inapplicable because the videotape was obtained through the 'calculated
misdeeds' of CBS.... Subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior
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on how the information was acquired with respect to the parties to
the litigation would logically comport with the ruling under
Rhinehart, which upheld a protective order "[w] here... [it] ... does
not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other
sources."228 Rhinehart thus suggests that acting "independently" is
akin to acquiring information identical to that in the protective order
from sources not connected to the litigation.2 29 Therefore, a court
would be able to enjoin a media nonparty from acquiring confiden-
tial material directly from the court.2 ° The result is less clear if
the media nonparty acquires the information from one of the
litigating parties in defiance of the protective order.
The Supreme Court provided guidance in Regal Knitwear Co. v.
NLRB,23" ' where it further delineated the scope of a court's injunc-
tive power under Rule 65 (d). In Regal Knitwear Co., the Court noted
that a court's power to issue an injunction binds not only the
defendants, but also those either identified with them in interest, in
"privity" with them, represented by them or subject to their con-
trol.232 In essence the Court held that defendants may not nullify
a decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors,
although the latter were not parties to the original proceeding.
Accordingly, for a media nonparty to be legally bound by a
protective order under the court's injunctive powers, one of two
criteria must be met: the nonparty must either be legally "identified"
with a party to the order, or must "aid and abet"23 3 a party to the
order.
23 4
restraints, ordinarily are the appropriate sanction for calculated defamation or other
misdeeds in the First Amendment context."). In New York Times, however, the
documents were not alleged to have been stolen by the media party itself but had
been acquired by a third party and then turned over to the media.
22 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984).
22 See Marcus, supra note 54, at 460 (noting that Rhinehart did not limit the
newspaper-party's right to publish material gained "outside of the discovery process,"
but that this was little consolation "because it might be very difficult to prove that they
had obtained information entirely independently of the discovery process").
'" See Krzton, supra note 213, at 1092-93 ("Where a judicial determination has
been made to compel the release of a trade secret under carefully circumscribed
conditions, a nonparty who derives access to the trade secret through the courts
cannot and should not escape the court's restrictions on use of the information.").
23 324 U.S. 9 (1945); see also Krzton, supra note 213, at 1086 (discussing the Regal
Knitwear Co. case).
222 324 U.S. at 14.
1 The purpose of the "aid and abet" criteria is to distinguish between an
individual who colludes with a party for the purpose of violating an injunction and an
individual who acts independently of a party bound by such an order. See infra Part
III.B.3.
2" See Quinter v. Volkswagen of America, 676 F.2d 969, 973 (3d Cir. 1982)
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2. The "Legal Identity" Test
In Quinter v. Volkswagen of America,35 the Third Circuit applied
its version of the "legal identity" test with respect to an expert witness
who was not a party to the lawsuit. The case arose out of a lawsuit
brought by plaintiff Quinter who sustained injuries in an automobile
accident involving a Volkswagen Beetle. During the discovery phase,
the district court granted Volkswagen's motion for a protective order
to seal certain materials Volkswagen considered trade secrets. 6
The materials covered by the protective order included a computer-
ized index list of various crash tests performed by Volkswagen on its
automobiles.23 7 The expert, who had been retained by the plain-
tiff, had access to the documents through the plaintiff and thereafter
distributed the materials to an outside lawyer who had hired the
expert as a consultant in an unrelated case against Volkswagen.
Although the expert was not named in the protective order, the
court held that the Regal Knitwear requirements 29 were fulfilled,
and that the expert was thus liable for contempt-the expert had
actual knowledge of the protective order and, through his agency
relationship with the plaintiff, was legally "identified" as a party.
240
The agency relationship of Quinter is not so easily transferred to
the situation where a media nonparty obtains information from one
of the litigants. By definition, an agent acts at the behest and for the
benefit of the principal,24 and therefore her interests in the merits
of the injunction are a function of the interests of the principal.242
It is arguable that there are situations where the media nonparty
does act "at the behest and for the benefit of the principal." For
instance, one member of a prominent law firm recently divulged that
he used calculated "leaks" to the press in order to publicize allega-
tions which would advance his client's cause.243 This link is attenu-
(reviewing the "thorough and exhaustive analysis of the case" in Thompson v.
Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
2m 676 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1982).
m See id. at 971.
237 See id.
2- See id. at 972.
19 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
240 See Quinter, 676 F.2d at 972.
241 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 63 (6th ed. 1990).
242 See Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, supra note 217, at 721.
24 See Geyelin, supra note 5, at A6 (describing how a prominent litigator utilized
a "strategy... to encourage reporters to publicize the allegations").
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ated, however, primarily because the media indisputably has its own
financial interest in publishing newsworthy information.
It is important to note that the Quinter protective order explicitly
released certain Volkswagen trade secrets to the plaintiff on the
condition that the use of the information would be confined to the
Quinter lawsuit.2 One commentator has thus argued that underly-
ing Quinter is the fact that the expert derived any interest he had in
the confidential discovery materials solely through the plaintiff.245
This "independent interest" analysis is consistent with the Supreme
Court's reading of Rule 65(d) in Golden State Bottling Co. v.
NLRB.24 There, the Court held that a purchaser-"successor" of a
new business was "in privity" with the prior employer and thus bound
by the employer's outstanding unfair labor practice claims because
of the purchaser's knowledge of the claims at the time of pur-
chase.24 Significantly, the Court reasoned that its holding did not
undermine the policy underlying 65(d) because a "tie" could be
established between the former employer and the purchaser which
established "the requisite relationship of dependence.
'" 248
In the context of a media nonparty who obtains the information
from a litigant, one could argue that the nonparty has established its
own state of "dependence" on the litigant, and that its rights in the
confidential materials likewise have "derived" from those of the
litigant. Therefore, since the litigant's rights to the information
exchanged in discovery are subject to a court's discretion,249 a
media nonparty's rights are likewise circumscribed. Moreover, Golden
State Bottling Co. suggests that the purchaser's awareness of the
outstanding unfair labor practice claims at the time of purchase was
significant to establish the "privity" connection. 25' The potential
244 The district court entered a protective order on January 23, 1979, which read
in pertinent part:
[I] tems obtained by plaintiff or his counsel pursuant to discovery in this case
are protected, and neither plaintiff nor his counsel shall themselves copy or
permit others to copy said items or otherwise use them for any purpose
other than that directly and reasonably related to the above-captioned case.
Quinter, 676 F.2d at 971.
245 See Krzton, supra note 213, at 1092.
246 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
247 See id. at 180.
248 Id.
24 See Post, supra note 48, at 194 ("[T]he rules of civil procedure do not give
litigants 'rights' to information that must be adjudicated before a neutral and
umpireal judge, but rather create a system of information exchange to be actively
managed by a judge....").
2o See Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 180 (holding that "a bona fide purchaser
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for an injunction to bind a media nonparty would therefore also
require the nonparty to have been aware of the protective order at
the time the court-protected information was obtained.251
3. The "Aider and Abettor" Test
A more simplistic, but possibly more accurate, analysis would
subject a media nonparty who acquires confidential discovery
information from a litigant to "aider and abettor" liability.252 Since
the purpose of aider-abettor liability is to enable an injunction to be
enforced against "all persons acting in conjunction with the enjoined
party," thereby negating the possibility of "independent activity," the
critical factual inquiry would examine the extent of collusion
between the media nonparty-"abettor" and the litigant.
23
The term "collusion" is defined as an "agreement between two or
more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law,
or to obtain an object forbidden by law."254  To collude, then,
requires an understanding that one is colluding. Given that the
information would be received from one of the litigants, the power
to bind the media nonparties from further dissemination would seem
to rely on the Golden State Bottling Co. "knowledge" requirement:255
acquiring with knowledge that the wrong remains unremedied the employing enterprise
which was the locus of the unfair labor practice, may be considered in privity with its
predecessor for purposes of 65(d)" (emphasis added)).
1 The task of inculpating the media nonparty for violating a protective order
based on knowledge of the order would not occur without its share of problems.
Chief among these problems would be the necessity for a hearing to determine how
the materials were obtained. This hearing would require putting reporters on the
stand and interrogating them as to their investigating methods. See, e.g., Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 . Supp. 186, 188 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (discussing
the hearing held "to determine whether the protected, confidential information
obtained by [the media nonparty] was acquired lawfully and independently of the
discovery process"). More importantly, the "freedom" of the press would ultimately
be implicated by the hearings, which would require reporters to reveal how they
received the protected materials, thereby giving up their confidential sources. See
MacLachlan, supra note 191, at Al.
252 SeeAlemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930) ("We agree that
a person who knowingly assists a defendant in violating an injunction subjects himself
to civil as well as criminal proceedings for contempt.").
20 Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, supra note 217, at 724. "Since the
purpose of the aider and abettor extension is to make the injunction effectual against
all persons acting in conjunction with the enjoined party... the crucial element is
the existence of collusion between the abettor and the party defendant." Id. (footnote
omitted).
2 BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 264 (6th ed. 1990).
1 See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
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whether the media nonparty had "knowledge" of the protective order
at the time it received the information. If the media nonparty knew of
the protective order at the time it received the material, further
dissemination would arguably constitute collusion with the litigant
who originally gave the media access and violated the protective
order.256 This "collusion" would be derived from the recognition
that, upon receiving the court-protected materials, the protective
order had been violated once; any further dissemination would
violate the protective order a second time. If the media nonparty did
not have knowledge of the protective order at the time it received
the materials, it arguably was not aiding or abetting the defendant
because the nonparty had a wholly "independent" interest in the
material.
57
" The "aider and abettor" classification is not entirely accurate, however. A
media nonparty may have only an incidental interest in colluding with the litigant to
violate the protective order-that is, the media nonparty clearly may have its own
financial interest in publishing the information. See Binding Nonparties to Injunction
Decrees, supra note 217, at 725. The First Circuit, however, decided a case, which
determined that this distinction was immaterial for purposes of "aiding and abetting"
a violation of an injunction. See Reich v. United States, 239 F.2d 134, 137-38 (1st Cir.
1956) (finding a psychiatrist in contempt for assisting a defendant in procuring a
scientific product in violation of an injunction), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957).
1 In spite of the foregoing analysis, it is arguable that the court could issue an
injunction enjoining a media nonparty from further dissemination without any of the
previously discussed limitations. Given the property interest in confidential business
information covered by a protective order, see supra Parts ll.B, Ill.A, the court may be
able to issue an in rem injunction. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S.
168, 179 (1973) ("Persons acquiring an interest in property that is a subject of
litigation are bound by, or entitled to the benefit of, a subsequent judgment, despite
a lack of knowledge."); see also United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96,
98 (W.D. Mo. 1946) (noting that "[ilt is only injunctions, acting in rem, that bind
successive ownerships of the rem"). Irrespective of Rule 65(d), courts have continued
to issue injunctions in rem against those parties, or nonparties, who threaten that
property interest. See United States v. Hall, 472 F2d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1972)
("[C]ourts have continued to issue in rem injunctions notwithstanding Rule 65(d),
since they possessed the power to do so at common law and since Rule 65(d) was
intended to embody rather than to limit their common law powers."). Because in rem
injunctions adjudicate conflicting claims to property interests and have thus been
subject to physical attachment by the court, these injunctions also lack the Rule 65 (d)
due process requirement that the nonparty subject to the injunction have "actual
knowledge" of the order. SeeJACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CMviL PROCEDURE § 3.8, at
114 (1985). Therefore, in rem injunctions, unlike Rule 65(d) injunctions, are
effective "'against all the world.'" Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 320 (1890) (quoting
Watson v. Ulbrich, 24 N.W. 732 (1885)). Given the overlap between speech and
property claims in the protective-order context, however, in rem injunctions without
"actual" notice would probably violate due process notice requirements.
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR ENFORCING PROTECTIVE ORDERS
AGAINST MEDIA NONPARTIES
Having explored legal doctrines that limit the use of certain
commercial information by nonparties because of the coexisting
private property interest in such information, it appears that a
nonparty who has acquired confidential discovery materials may be
within the jurisdictional reach of the courts.259 The suggestion that
protective orders may be enforced against media nonparties in
certain situations requires further refining. For instance, a court may
issue a protective order even when the corresponding property
interest in the sealed material is suspect. Moreover, a media
nonparty may acquire information under protective seal by many
different means-such as buying the information from a litigant, or
finding the information on a street corner-and not all of these
methods enable a court to find the required link between a party and
the media nonparty. Therefore, some guidance is necessary in order
to know when an injunction issued against a media nonparty in
possession of protective-order information is constitutionally valid.
A. Developing a Standard That Reflects Both How Protective Order
Information Is Acquired and How the
Proprietary Interest Is Affected
The power of a court to enforce its protective order against a
media nonparty who has acquired sealed information turns on two
issues: (1) whether an injunction will "reach" the nonlitigant, and
(2) whether there are competing interests which would advise against
the injunction.
1. Injunctive Power Based upon How Protected Material Is
Acquired: The "Active Procurement" Standard
The scope of a court's injunctive power, as discussed above,
depends on when the media nonlitigant had knowledge of the injunc-
tion, and how the media nonlitigant acquired the information.260
It is clear that the media nonparty must have notice of the protective
order at the time it acquires the information.26' This test protects the
See supra Part H1IA.
See supra Part III.B.
260 See id.
261 See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
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media nonlitigant who gathers information and is later informed that
the material is under protective seal.
The more difficult determination is the circumstances under
which a media nonparty's method of acquiring the enjoined informa-
tion should subject it to a court's injunctive power. Recall that a
media nonparty must either be "legally identified" with a party to the
order, or the media nonparty must "aid and abet" a violation to the
order. These standards suggest a distinction between acquiring
protected information by happenstance, and acquiring it directly
from the opposing litigant. To distinguish between these two
situations, and others that are more vague, a court should determine
whether the media nonparty actively procured the information from
the court or the litigant.
An active procurement standard relies on the notion that the
media nonlitigant possessed the requisite knowledge of the protective
order262 and nevertheless took some positive action to acquire the
information. Positive action could encompass acts as simple as a
phone call to the litigant's attorney, or as complex as the use of false
pretenses to gather confidential material directly from the court.
Actively acquiring material directly from a litigant or from the court
comports more closely with the "legal identity" test and the "aider
and abettor" standard than would a standard that does not restrict
itself to active acquisition. Moreover, this standard is consistent with
the idea that the media nonlitigant lacks an "independent" interest
in the material because any arguable interest is derived from the
parties' interests. To the extent that the media nonparty does
actively acquire the information, then the required link between a
nonparty and a party to the protective order can be established, and
the injunctive power should "reach."
2. Injunctive Power Based upon Proprietary Interest:
"Bona Fide Trade Secret" Standard
The second issue to be analyzed is whether proprietary interests
warrant the extension of protective-order enforcement to media
nonparties, recognizing the First Amendment interests to the
contrary. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the predominance of certain private property interests in intangible
property even in the event of competing First Amendment inter-
262 See id.
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ests. 263 The proprietary interests, however, must be not only clearly
established, but also substantial.2' Therefore, property interests
that are incidental to owners' other interests will fail to provide
support for injunctive relief in the face of competing First Amend-
ment claims.
While the Supreme Court recognizes private property interests in
certain intangibles like trade secrets, 265 protective orders are not
limited to sealing this type of information. Indeed, protective orders
may cover information whose corresponding property interest may
be only incidental. Determining this property interest is crucial
because a media nonparty's ability to publish protective-order
information may turn on the extent of this interest.
266
In general, there are two basic justifications for requesting a
protective order: adverse publicity, and confidential commercial
information (including trade secrets) .267 Because the justification
used to issue a protective order is generally a good indicator of the
property interest involved, these two justifications will be examined
separately.
a. Adverse Publicity
Although litigants generally carry the burden of allowing the
public to learn information which the litigant would rather keep
private," occasionally a protective order may be issued under Rule
26(c)'s express authorization to protect a litigant generally from
"annoyance, embarrassment, [or] oppression," which may result from
the disclosure of details of a litigant's activities.269 In Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 210 the Third Circuit addressed a request for a
protective order to prevent adverse publicity. The Cipollone case
involved multiple product liability actions against tobacco companies.
The defendant companies asserted that although the discovery
263 See supra Part III.A.
264 See supra Part HIA3.
26 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (determining
that trade secrets constitute "property" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause).
266 See supra Part III.A.3.
267 See FRANcIs H. HARE, JR., ET AL., CONFIDENTIALITy ORDERS 118, 129-35
(discussing grounds for requesting protective orders); Marcus, supra note 54, at 488-93
(discussing the standards for issuance of a protective order).
26 See HARE, supra note 267, at 135-36.
269 FED. P- Civ. P. 26(c).
270 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986).
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information did not contain trade secrets, it included materials which
if made public would cause them annoyance and embarrassment
sufficient to justify a protective order.27 1 Rather than decide
whether a protective order should issue, the Third Circuit enunciated
a standard to help the lower court determine whether a claim of
embarrassment warranted a protective order: "[T]o succeed, a
business will have to show with some specificity that the embarrass-
ment resulting from dissemination of the information would cause
a significant harm to its competitive and financial position. "272 The
Third Circuit thus virtually eliminated justifications for protective
orders based on general claims of embarrassment and required a
commercial litigant to show not only a certain level of specificity, but
also that the specific embarrassment "will be particularly serious."
273
Under Cipollone, a protective order may cover information which, if
released, would cause "serious embarrassment" and financial harm
to proprietary interests.274 While Cipollone is illustrative of the
notion that protective orders can be issued after making the requisite
showing based on embarrassment notions, it is important to note
what the decision does not accomplish. It does not establish that the
commercial litigant seeking the protective order has a proprietary
interest in the information itself In Cipollone, where the defendants
acknovledged that the information sought to be covered did not
contain trade secrets, the proprietary interest involved related solely
to the effect that the public release of the information would have on
their financial standing. 275 This distinction is crucial when the
protective-order information is now in the hands of a media
nonlitigant. If a media nonlitigant has acquired material which is
under protective order of the court, and the information is not
linked to a property interest of a commercial litigant, then the First
Amendment considerations will override any contrary arguments for
enforcing the protective order.276 With respect to protective orders
based on adverse publicity, litigants will find little support in
enforcing these orders against media nonlitigants.




215 See id. ("The defendants assert that although the material they have turned over
does not contain trade secrets, it does include materials the dissemination of which
would cause them annoyance and embarrassment... ").
276 See supra Part III.A.3.
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b. Confidential Commercial Information, Including Trade Secrets
While confidential commercial information and trade secrets
often directly implicate proprietary interests, these interests vary in
substantive force. For instance, while few would doubt the validity of
Coca-Cola's proprietary interest in its secret formula, many would
question the intrinsic value of an oil company's lists of dissatisfied
customers. Yet both interests justified the authorization of protective
orders2 77 pursuant to Rule 26(c) (7): protecting "a trade secret or
other confidential research, development or commercial informa-
tion. "27  By its explicit terms, Rule 26(c) (7) protects a source of
information broader than only "true" trade secrets.279
The consequence of Rule 26(c) (7)'s breadth of coverage is that
some confidential information sealed by a protective order-namely
that information failing to qualify for trade secret status-has a less
clearly recognizable proprietary interest. The essence of a trade
secret is the ability to gain an advantage over competitors who lack
similar knowledge.280 Presumably, the use of protective orders
guards a trade secret's confidentiality during the discovery stage of
litigation, which maintains its proprietary value. Contrast such a use
of protective orders with the use of protective orders issued to
prevent the disclosure of confidential information that is not a trade
secret, but nonetheless could injure a corporation's reputation and
277 See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 ER.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985)
(describing, in a suit that attempted to force the Coca-Cola, Co. to disclose its secret
formula pursuant to a protective order, the extent to which Coca-Cola Co. protected
the formula); American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 FR.D. 680,
683-84 (D.R.I. 1959) (showing that Rule 26(c)(7)'s equivalent predecessor, Rule
30(b), allowed protective orders to protect lists of dissatisfied customers).
2 78 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (7).
29 It should be noted, however, that some courts have looked to the Restatement
of Torts definition of trade secrets to determine whether a protective order should
issue. See, e.g., Smith v. BIC Corp., 121 F.R.D. 235, 239-40 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting
that Pennsylvania courts, in determining whether a protective order should issue, have
relied on § 757 of the Restatement of Torts for the definition of "trade secret");
Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 28-29 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("Plaintiff
and defendant agree that the criteria for determining whether information is a trade
secret are set out in the Restatement of Torts § 757."); United States v. IBM, 67 FR.D.
40, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("In [protecting information under Rule 26(c)] the court
will be guided by considerations commonly employed when determining if certain
information rises to the level of a trade secret such as is embodied in Section 757 of
the Restatement of Torts.").
M See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF Toars § 757 (1939) (providing that trade secrets
"may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain a competitive
advantage over competitors who do not know it or use it").
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cause a decline in its stock value."' In the latter situation, the
information itself has no proprietary interest outside the effect it may
have on the corporation's capital stock value. Therefore, while some
protective orders may cover certain confidential information that is
undoubtedly a trade secret and thus proprietary in nature,282 "this
subject-matter category is broad enough to include a wide variety of
business information," 283 not all of which may reach the level of
"property."
The complexity of identifying property interests in confidential
information covered by a protective order is exacerbated by the fact
that courts routinely approve stipulated orders for large volumes of
documents using relaxed standards. 284 This is generally due to the
interest in facilitating the efficient and cooperative exchange of
discovery materials by eliminating additional procedures for sorting
the "truly" confidential documents from those that are not.285 The
consequence is that some discovery material covered by a protective
order may not be deserving of "property" status. If this were the
case, the First Amendment would be more directly implicated by an
injunction restraining the media nonparty.
Therefore, the analysis of the two basic justifications for protec-
tive orders appears to describe three levels of property interests:
281 See Littlejohn v. BIG Corp., 851 E2d 673, 685 (3d Cir. 1988). In Littlejohn a
protective order was issued despite the fact that documents of the defendant were not
trade secrets. The general commercial interest was the desire to preserve corporate
reputation. The court found that the protection to which the information was
entitled at the evidentiary stage was less than that to which a "true" trade secret was
entitled. See id.
See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 ER.D. 288, 289 (D. Del.
1985) (acknowledging the formula for Coca-Cola to be "one of the best-kept trade
secrets in the world").
28" Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 890 (E.D.
Pa. 1981). In a footnote, the Zenith court described a list of different types of business
information which had been covered by protective orders in previous cases. These
included financial statements, customer lists and lists of dissatisfied customers. See id.
at 890 n.42.
284 See HARE, supra note 267, at 116 (noting that "some courts have honored
[stipulated-order] requests" while others still required good cause); see also Schmitt,
supra note 123, at B1 ("'Judges often 'rubber stamp' [stipulated confidential]
agreements ... though a million pages of documents may be involved even in a
routine matter.'" (quoting Boris Feldman, an attorney for high-tech companies)).
' See Schmitt, supra note 123, at B1 ("Judges and lawyers would have to spend an
inordinate amount of time sorting through an avalanche of documents to determine
what really should be kept confidential."); see also The O.J. Gag Rule, WALL ST. J., Oct.
5, 1995, at A14 ("Parties routinely file mountains of documents with the court, which
in turn routinely grants requests to deny access to avoid the job of actually wading
through them to evaluate their confidentiality.").
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"Bona fide" trade secrets with the highest property interest, other
confidential information with an intermediate level of property
interests, and adverse publicity claims with the lowest level of
interests. Because of the difficulty in discerning the varying property
interests in the intermediate level, and the importance of the First
Amendment interests at stake, protective-order enforcement against
a media nonlitigant should be limited to bona fide trade secrets.
These trade secrets can be distinguished from other confidential
financial information by using the definitions provided by the First
Restatement of Torts28 6 and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
287
Some courts have already adopted the definitions provided by the
Restatement in formulating standards for issuance of protective
orders.288 Implementing a bona fide trade secret determination
would thus be a natural transition.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of whether a court may prevent or sanction a media
nonparty for publishing materials that are under a protective order
will not be resolved without severe repercussions. The media has a
clear interest in challenging any decision that may encroach upon
their right as a free press in an open society.289 At the same time,
the lower courts have a legitimate interest in administering and
maintaining control of the cases before them.90 Moreover, the
private litigants may have any number of interests at stake that could
be implicated by allowing nonparty dissemination. The one certainty
286 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939) ("The significant
difference of fact between trade secrets and processes or devices which are not secret
is that knowledge of the latter is available to the copier without the use of improper
means to procure it, while knowledge of the former is ordinarily available to him only
by the use of such means.").
See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1994).
See, e.g., United States v. IBM, 67 R.ILD. 40, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reciting the
factors of secrecy listed in the Restatement).
289 See The Story You Should Be Reading, Bus. WK., Oct. 2, 1995, at 150 ("The power
to censor is the power to regulate information. It is unacceptable in a market
democracy.").
I See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962) ("We start with the premise that
the right of courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled way lies at the
foundation of our system of government and that courts necessarily must possess the
means of punishing for contempt when conduct tends directly to prevent the
discharge of their functions."); see also The Story You Should Be Reading, supra note 289,
at 150 ("The federal judiciary must have the right to set and enforce rules.").
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in this debate is that the rationale underlying the protective order
will be vitiated if nonparties are allowed the dissemination right.
The challenge facing the courts is to utilize their broad discretion
in approving protective orders wisely.291 Because requiring a court
to differentiate confidential from nonconfidential material would
undermine the interest in judicial efficiency, a media nonparty who
has acquired court-protected material that it believes is outside the
realm of "property" should request a modification of the order to
avoid the consequences of dissemination and further violation of the
order.292
The facts of the Business Week case serve to illustrate the multi-
tude of interests involved when prior restraint and protective-order
issues are involved. Although this case has recently been overturned
by Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals based on prior restraint
grounds,23 this decision is not necessarily inconsistent with the
proposal in this Comment. First, it is debatable whether Business
Week had actual knowledge of the protective order before it acquired
the disputed information, 4 which calls into question satisfaction
of an active procurement standard. Even assuming that Business Week
was aware of the protective order before it acquired the information,
the information sought to be published falls short of a bona fide
trade secret. Based on the information eventually published in
Business Week, 95 the protective order in that case seems to have
been imposed primarily to stem the financial and competitive harm
to the litigants that would be caused by publication of the potentially
"' See Marcus, supra note 54, at 489-90 (arguing that "trying to narrow the grounds
for protection under Rule 26(c) unduly constricts the broad discretion the rule vests
in district courts to superintend the discovery process"); see also Post, supra note 48,
at 225 ("Although Rule 26(c) makes no effort to specify 'narrow, objective and
definite standards' to govern the issuance of restraining orders, any attempt to do so
would likely cripple trial courts' ability effectively to manage the pretrial exchange of
discovery information." (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151
(1969))).
22 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(denying a challenge by a nonparty broadcaster to access discovery documents in a
litigation involving Vietnam War veterans and exposure to herbicides); see also HARE,
supra note 267, at 144-47 (discussing modification of protective orders).
Is See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 224-27 (6th Cir.
1996).
294 Compare id. at 223 (noting that "[n]either the partner [who turned over the
information] nor the journalist appeared to know that the material was under seal")
with id. at 229 (Brown, J., dissenting) (noting that "[a]lthough aware of [the
protective] order, Business Week reporters managed to get the documents").
29 SeeKelly Holland, et al., TheBankers Trust Tapes, BUS. WK., Oct. 16, 1995, at 106.
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embarrassing material, rather than to prevent the disclosure of trade
secrets.296 The Sixth Circuit reversal, therefore, does not settle the
issue. It only stirs the debate.
296 Among the information published were excerpts from the 6,500 tape recordings
of Bankers Trust confidential conversations. See id.
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